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Risk Bearing in Individual and 
Occupational Pension Plans
 James E. Pesando
John A. Turner
INTRODUCTION
Financial risk is inherent in pension plans.  It is inherent in their
financing and in the accrual of pension rights by workers.  It must be
borne, but that can be done in different ways—by workers, the
employer, an insurance company, stockholders and bondholders of the
company, the government (taxpayers), or by other employers.    
The rules governing the conditions of benefit payments and
required contributions determine who bears pension risk.  Some rules
are explicit, determined by law, collective bargaining agreements, or
the pension benefit formula.  Others are implicit or are decided by
employers, for example, the circumstances under which the firm will
provide cost-of-living adjustments to retirement benefits or terminate
the pension plan.
Pension risks in funded pension plans arise in part due to macro-
economic risks: nondiversifiable investment risk in financial markets,
variability in defined benefit liabilities caused by changing interest
rates, and inflation-caused variability in the real value of imperfectly
indexed benefits of retirees and in the real value of nominally fixed
benefits of job changers.  Pension accrual risks for workers arise due to
uncertainty in the supply and demand for their labor as well as an
uncertain life expectancy.  
Pension funds face risks, including political risks arising due to
governmental changes in pension regulations.  They also face risks due
to financial malfeasance by pension fund managers or due to the possi-
bility that the employer will terminate the pension plan in bankruptcy
with the plan being insolvent. 
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Pensions also insure workers against risks.  An annuitized pension
insures workers against the risks of being unable to work in old age and
of outliving one’s resources.
Changes in the occupational pension systems in Canada and the
United States towards greater reliance on defined contribution plans
appear to have shifted risks from employers to workers.  The simplest
hypothesis for a shift in risk bearing is that the costs of risk bearing by
employers have increased.  This chapter compares the Canadian and
U.S. employer-provided pension systems.  While the focus is on the
comparison of the two systems, the chapter begins by describing the
Canadian system, which is less well-known.  Information about the
U.S. system is presented as it compares to the Canadian system.
Background
The level of family income in Canada and the United States is
roughly equivalent.  While average family income is slightly higher (by
2.2 percent) in the United States, median family income is slightly
lower (by 4.4 percent), reflecting the greater income inequality in the
United States (Wolfson and Murphy 1994).1
The elderly in the United States, however, have considerably
higher income than they do in Canada—19 percent higher for couples
aged 65–74.  The mix of income among the elderly also differs.  Social
security benefits are higher in Canada—6 percent higher for couples
aged 65–74, accounting for 40 percent of the income of that group.  In
comparison, social security benefits account for 31 percent of income
for U.S. couples in the same age group.  Income from private sources
(earnings from working, pensions, and savings) is higher in the United
States (Wolfson and Murphy 1994).2
The next sections compare the Canadian and U.S. systems of indi-
vidual and occupational private pension plans and discuss trends in risk
bearing.  Social security pensions are discussed in Chapter 5.
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INDIVIDUAL AND OCCUPATIONAL PENSION PLANS IN 
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Canadian Pension Plans
In Canada, favorable tax treatment is provided to three types of
pension plans: Registered Pension Plans (RPP), Deferred Profit Shar-
ing Plans (DPSP), and Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSP).
“Registered” refers to federal registration under the Income Tax Act of
a plan by a plan sponsor.  The term “registered” is the Canadian equiv-
alent to the U.S. term “qualified,” which refers to pension plans that
qualify for preferential tax treatment under the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code.  Registered Pension Plans include plans for both private and
public sector employees.  They are employer-sponsored plans and
include both defined benefit and defined contribution plans.  Registered
Deferred Profit Sharing plans are little used. 
Canadian pensions cover 43.4 percent of all employed (govern-
ment and private sector) workers (45.3 percent of men and 41.1 percent
of women).  The pension coverage rate for employed workers in the
private sector is 31 percent (39 percent for men and 21 percent for
women).  The coverage rate in the public sector is nearly 100 percent
for both men and women.  At the beginning of 1996, 48 percent of the
members of occupational pension plans were public sector employees,
a percentage that has grown over time. 
In recent years, the pension coverage rate has been stable.  The per-
centage of the total workforce (including the unemployed) belonging
to an employer-provided pension plan ranged from 35 to 37 percent
between 1983 and 1993.  However, by 1996, participation in employer-
provided pension plans was 3 percent lower than the peak in 1992
(Payne 1997).  The drop in RPP participation is entirely due to a
decline in the participation of men.  Layoffs in manufacturing, trans-
portation, and construction, traditionally high coverage industries,
explain part of the drop in male pension coverage.  Between 1984 and
1994, the percentage of employed women covered by employer-spon-
sored pension plans increased from 37 to 42 percent, while the percent-
age of employed men covered fell from 55 to 47 percent.  In contrast,
the percentage of workers contributing to individual account plans
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(RRSPs) almost doubled, growing from 18 percent in 1983 to 35 per-
cent in 1993 (Statistics Canada 1996).
In each year in the early 1990s, about half of Canadian employed
workers contributed to at least one of the two most commonly used
types of pension plans.  Over the period 1991–1993, about 60 percent
of employed workers contributed in at least one of the three years.
About 40 percent contributed in all three years (Maser 1995).  Contri-
butions to RRSPs are voluntary and workers need not contribute each
year.   Almost half of the participants from 1991 to 1993 contributed in
only one or two of the three years.  In contrast, most members belong-
ing to an employer-sponsored RPP participated each year because RPP
membership is generally compulsory for workers covered by a plan.
While access to RPPs is limited because many employers do not offer
them, all workers with employment earnings are eligible to save
through an RRSP.  Most RPP members have the option of adding to
their pension savings with RRSP contributions.
The contribution limit to a RRSP is reduced by the previous year’s
contribution to a pension plan.  This feature penalizes job changers
who lose pension coverage.  They cannot make a full RRSP contribu-
tion for a year because they are limited by their previous year’s partici-
pation in an RPP.
In Canada, RPPs are commonly integrated with social security (the
Quebec/Canada Pension Plan).  Integration with Old Age Security
(OAS) benefits is not permitted in some provinces.  Integration means
that the RPP benefits are offset by the worker’s social security benefits.
Among public sector pension participants, 90 percent are in integrated
plans.  Nearly 80 percent of private sector defined benefit plan mem-
bers have integrated benefits.  By reducing the occupational pension
benefits of lower wage workers, integration offsets the progressivity of
social security.
Until recently, Canada had a policy of providing tax relief for pen-
sion contributions on income up to 2.5 times the average wage.  It has,
however, frozen the nominal maximum earnings that can receive tax
relief so that it is expected that the maximum earnings receiving tax
relief will be approximately two times the average wage by 2006.  This
change will increase the overall progressivity of the retirement income
system by reducing the tax subsidy going to high earners.
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Most public sector pension plans for government workers provide
generous benefits, based on final average earnings, and require mem-
bers to contribute towards their benefits.  These plans usually grant
generous survivor benefits and index for inflation.  By contrast, private
sector plans usually are less generous.
Canadian Pension Regulation
For constitutional reasons, with the exception of applicable tax
provisions, occupational pensions are generally regulated by the pro-
vincial governments.  This causes regional differences in pension regu-
lation.  However, certain occupations fall under federal jurisdiction,
including the federal public service, the armed forces, the Royal Cana-
dian Mounted Police, and a number of sectors of national importance
(e.g., banks, railways, airlines, and communication companies).  Pen-
sion plans for employees in these categories are regulated directly by
the federal government in Ottawa.  
A major factor discouraging establishment of new plans in Canada
is the complexity of pension laws.  The Pension Benefits Acts are
detailed and differ among the 11 government authorities (10 provinces
plus federal).  Laws designed to reduce risks to workers have become
so expensive for employers to comply with that they may be counter-
productive.  Some employers have switched their defined benefit pen-
sion plans to money purchase (defined contribution) plans or have
terminated them in favor of group RRSPs.
When a pension plan covers members in more than one province,
the laws of each province apply to the members in that province.  Like-
wise, if an employee has accrued benefits for work in more than one
province, the laws of each province apply to the benefits accrued
within that province, even for work within a single plan.  Although
U.S. pension law is complex, and is thought to be a factor in discourag-
ing small firms from establishing defined benefit plans, the variation
across provinces in Canada is an aspect of complexity not faced in the
United States.  Canadian federal and provincial regulators have made
little progress towards uniform legislation.
The Pension Benefits Acts in the different provinces allow an
employer to set up pension plans for distinct classes of employees (or
to refrain from doing so).  They, however, give all employees within a
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class for which a plan exists the right to join after two years of service
(one year in Quebec).  Part-time workers must be allowed to participate
in the pension plan for their class, provided their earnings exceed a
minimum amount.  This treatment of part-time workers is more favor-
able than in the United States where plan sponsors may, and generally
do, exclude part-time workers (working less than 1,000 hours a year)
from their pension plans.  The two-year vesting requirement is also
more liberal than in the United States, where the requirement is five
years.  In these two respects—part-time workers and vesting—Cana-
dian pension plans provide greater protection of workers than do U.S.
plans.  In the chapter on social security, it was similarly noted that
Canadian workers with low service receive more favorable treatment
from the social security system.
Employees’ representatives have argued that pension contributions
are deferred pay that should not be forfeited if the member dies.  In line
with this philosophy, some of the provincial Pension Benefits Acts pro-
vide for benefits to survivors in the case of preretirement death.  In
some provinces, the spouse of a member who dies in service after vest-
ing is entitled to the full value of the member’s deferred pension.  In
other provinces, the spouse must receive at least 60 percent of the value
of the member’s pension. 
Private Pension Plans in the United States
Private pension plans in the United States have traditionally been
predominantly defined benefit plans, but that situation has changed.  In
1975, 72 percent of the assets in private sector employer-provided pen-
sion plans were in defined benefit plans.  By 1996, that percentage fell
to 51 percent, a decline on average of one percentage point per year
over the 21-year period (U.S. Department of Labor 2000).  Projecting
the trend to the year 2000, less than half of pension assets in the United
States were in defined benefit plans at the turn of the century.
The trend has been even more dramatic for participants.  In 1975,
71 percent of active participants in pension plans were in defined bene-
fit plans, roughly the same percentage as for assets.  By 1996, only 34
percent of active participants were in defined benefit plans.  The num-
ber of active participants in defined benefit plans has declined from a
high of 30.2 million in 1984 to 23.3 million in 1996.
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The growth of 401(k) plans has played a major role in the growth
of defined contribution plans and the decline in defined benefit plans.
401(k) plans are defined contribution plans where employees as well as
employers can make tax deductible contributions.  These plans are
named after the section of the Internal Revenue Code that enabled
them.  For other types of defined contribution plans, as well as for
defined benefit plans, employees’ contributions in the United States are
not tax deductible.
A related trend is the growth of cash balance plans.  Cash balance
plans are one of the major innovations in pensions that occurred during
the 1990s.  Few firms sponsored them before the early 1990s, but a
1999 survey indicated that 19 percent of all Fortune 1000 firms spon-
sored them at the end of the decade (U.S. General Accounting Office
2000).  These plans are legally classified as defined benefit plans
because the value of promised benefits is not based on the value of
actual plan assets, but they incorporate features of defined contribution
plans.  Each worker has a hypothetical account to which hypothetical
contributions and hypothetical interest payments are credited.
From the perspective of workers, each worker has an individual
account with an account balance.  Each period, the employer contrib-
utes to the account on behalf of the worker.  In these respects, cash bal-
ance plans are exactly like defined contribution plans.  In cash balance
plans, workers know the amount in the account, making it much easier
to understand than traditional defined benefit plans, where it is difficult
to determine the value of benefits accrued in mid career.  For this rea-
son, cash balance plans are like traditional defined contribution plans in
that the benefits are portable for job changers.
In a typical defined benefit plan, workers face risks associated with
the wage payments in their final years of work.  Under a typical defined
contribution plan, these risks are reduced because the benefit is based
on wages over the entire career.  In this respect, cash balance plans are
like defined contribution plans.
Each period, interest is credited to the account.  The interest rate
may be guaranteed at a fixed level or may vary with the rate on a partic-
ular asset, such as 30-year Treasury bills.  To the extent that the credit-
ing rate varies with financial market conditions, workers bear financial
market risk on their cash balance accounts, as do workers with defined
contribution plans.
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When interest rates vary, that causes capital gains or losses on
holdings of bonds due to associated changes in bond prices.  This type
of financial market risk is not inherently an aspect of cash balance
plans, and in this respect differs from defined contribution plans.  How-
ever, as they are currently governed by pension regulation, the lump
sum payment a worker would receive at termination may vary due to
changes in interest rates because the lump-sum payment is calculated
as the present value of the expected benefit at retirement.  When the
expected benefit at retirement is determined by a crediting rate that dif-
fers from the rate used to discount future benefits, workers will bear
financial market risk due to capital gains of losses caused by interest
rate changes on the present value of their pension benefits.  In cash bal-
ance plans, workers may face interest rate risk at the time of retirement
if they wish to annuitize their account balance.  This risk is typical of
defined contribution plans.
As well as participating in employer-provided plans, workers may
also establish Individual Retirement Accounts for themselves.  How-
ever, these plans are of little consequence for most workers because of
the low maximum allowable annual contribution of $2,000.
Nearly half of all U.S. private sector employees participate in a
retirement plan, and pension costs average 4.3 percent of payroll for
plan sponsors (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1992).  In 1993, 49 percent
of all wage and salary workers were covered by a pension plan.  The
coverage rate was 43 percent in the private sector and 77 percent in the
public sector.  Public sector pension participants accounted for about a
quarter (27 percent) of all pension participants (U.S. Department of
Labor 1994), far less than in Canada (48 percent).
THE TAX TREATMENT OF PENSIONS IN CANADA 
AND THE UNITED STATES
By providing favorable tax treatment to pensions as compared with
other assets, Canadian and U.S. tax policies encourage firms to offer
pension plans.  Because of their proximity and the similarities in
income and culture, it might be thought that the tax policy toward pen-
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sions of the two neighbors would be similar.  In fact, important differ-
ences exist that may cause differences in their private pension systems. 
In both Canada and the United States, the tax treatment of pensions
from the employer perspective is the same.  Employer contributions to
a pension plan are treated similarly to wages—both are tax deductible
under the corporate income tax.  Investment earnings in pension funds
accumulate tax free.  Pension assets and liabilities are not taxed.3
Workers are not taxed at the time their employer contributes to a
pension fund on their behalf.  All distributions from pension funds to
workers are taxable under the personal income tax.  In Canada, retirees
receive an annual tax credit for the first Can.$1,000 of pension income.
Pension distributions in both countries are not subject to the social
security payroll tax.  Worker contributions are treated differently in the
two countries, and are discussed later.   
The tax system affects the role of pensions in the compensation of
workers.4  We examine how the tax treatment of pensions affects three
aspects of pensions relating to risk bearing: 1) pension coverage rates,
2) the generosity of pension benefits, and 3) defined benefit versus
defined contribution plans.5
Pension Coverage
The pension coverage rate is the percentage of the workforce par-
ticipating in a pension plan.  While the concept is simple, the ways cov-
erage is measured differ considerably, producing wide variation in
statistics.
Empirical comparisons of private sector workers in Canada and the
United States are difficult because the distinction between the private
sector and public sector is not as clear in Canada as it is in the United
States.  It appears that some public sector Canadian workers who work
for institutions such as universities, hospitals, and public corporations
(such as Air Canada), rather than traditional government bureaucracies,
respond in household surveys that they are private sector workers.
Because of this apparent misreporting, Canadian data for the entire
workforce are more reliable than data that attempt to separate out pri-
vate sector workers.  However, because the public sector is relatively
larger in Canada and because pension coverage rates are considerably
higher in the public than the private sector, empirical comparisons
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across the two countries are difficult.  In sum, the coverage rate for the
entire workforce has the advantage that it indicates the percentage of
the workforce in the two countries that has an employer-provided pen-
sion that supplements social security.  It has the disadvantage that it is
influenced by government policy concerning the relative size of the
public sector.
Dailey and Turner (1992) attempted to measure private pension
coverage on a comparable basis for Canada and the United States.
That study found that, for many years, the private pension coverage
rate has been about 50 percent higher in the United States than in Can-
ada.  Since 1975, the pension coverage rate for full-time private sector
workers has varied between 28 and 30 percent in Canada, while it has
varied between 44 and 46 percent in the United States.  
Several problems cause those figures to overstate the difference in
private sector coverage rates between the two countries.  Since 1990
Statistics Canada has stated that it was not possible to accurately deter-
mine private sector pension coverage rates in Canada because of diffi-
culties in determining who was in the private sector and that previous
figures underestimated pension coverage.  In addition, the U.S. figures
are overstated because the Canadian figures are for the entire labor
force, including the unemployed, while the U.S. figures are for wage
and salary workers, excluding the unemployed.  Adjusting for these
problems, based on a subjective assessment of the magnitude of their
effects, it would still appear that the private sector pension coverage
rate was at least 5 percentage points higher in the United States.  
Because of high coverage rates in the public sector and a higher
relative amount of workers in the public sector, coverage rates for all
workers, public and private sector, are higher in Canada for all income
levels except the lowest, where the rate is marginally lower in Canada
(Table 6.1).  The coverage rates are 10–20 percentage points higher in
the middle income categories, while the difference is only 4 percentage
points in the highest income category.
The pension coverage of males has been declining in both Canada
and the United States, while that of females has been increasing, pre-
sumably due to the increasing lifetime labor force participation of
females.  While in both countries the overall pension coverage rate has
been fairly stable, in both it appears from the decline in male pension
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coverage rate that, holding constant employee work patterns, the prob-
ability of occupational pension coverage has decreased.  
There has been a trend towards defined contribution plans in both
countries.  In Canada the membership in defined contribution plans
increased from 8.4 percent of plan members in 1990 to 10.0 percent at
the beginning of 1995.
Marginal income tax rates
In both countries, pension coverage rates increase with income,
presumably at least partially because tax rates increase with income,
but also because preferential tax treatment is worth more to individuals
with high marginal income tax rates.  If an individual’s marginal
income tax rate is the same in the preretirement and postretirement
periods, then—in both Canada and the United States—the individual
earns the pretax rate of return on pension saving.  This occurs because
the investment earnings on pension funds are untaxed.  The incentive
that the tax system provides for participating in a pension is thus higher
with higher marginal income tax rates.  The “wedge” between the pre-
tax and the after-tax rate of return is higher in Canada for most workers
because income tax rates are higher in Canada and the top rates are
reached at lower levels of income.  
Provincial tax rates differ in Canada but to a lesser extent than do
state income tax rates (Alpert, Shoven, and Whalley 1992).  About 40
percent of Canadian employees work in the province of Ontario, and
thus Ontario is a major component of the Canadian experience.  In
1996, the maximum tax rate—federal plus provincial—was 53 percent
Table 6.1 Pension Coverage Rates, by Income, All Workers (%)
Earnings (U.S.$) Canada (1989) United States (1993)
1 – 14,999 27 28
15,000 – 22,499 59 48
22,500 – 29,999 72 52
30,000 – 44,999 82 62
45,000 or more 73 69
SOURCE: Canada—Frenken and Maser (1992, p. 29); United States—unpublished
tabulations from Current Population Survey Special Pension Supplement, 1993.
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in Ontario (Table 6.2).  This maximum rate was reached at a taxable
income of $49,990.  (Unless indicated otherwise, all amounts are
expressed in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate of U.S.$0.75 per
Can.$1)
Marginal federal income tax rates were reduced in both countries
during the 1980s.  In Canada, the top rate was reduced from 65 percent
in 1980 to 29 percent in 1987.  It should be noted, however, that pro-
vincial income tax rates are much higher than state income tax rates.
For this reason, comparing only marginal federal tax rates is mislead-
ing because the federal-provincial split of income tax is far different in
Canada than the federal-state split is in the United States.
The highest marginal U.S. income tax rate on federal personal
income taxes was 80 percent in 1980.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986
reduced the top federal rate on wealthiest households to 28 percent.
The highest rate was 33 percent and applied for some middle income
taxpayers.  Marginal tax rates have since risen.  In 1994, the highest
marginal federal income tax rate was 39.6 percent and applied to fami-
lies with income above $250,000 (Table 6.2).  In addition, taxpayers
are liable for state income tax, which in some states reaches as high as
11 percent.  Thus, the highest marginal income tax rate in the United
Table 6.2 Marginal Federal Plus Provincial or State Income Tax Rates 
in Canada and the United Statesa (%)






0 – 22,750 (up to) 27 19
22,750 – 55,100 (up to) 53 33
55,100 – 115,000 53 36
115,000 – 250,000 53 42
250,000 or more 53 46
a Provincial income tax rates are much higher in Canada than are state income tax rates
in the United States.  The average state income tax rates are calculated from the CPS
Special Pension Supplement, April 1993 for the 1992 tax year.  For the income brack-
ets in the table, they are, respectively, 3.8%, 4.6%, 5.1%, and 5.9%.  Because of top
coding of income in the data, there is no income reported greater than $250,000.  The
average state income tax rate for the preceding category is used for the top income
category in this table.
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States (state plus federal rates) is currently 51 percent, but only the top
few percent of families pay that rate.  Workers with family income of
$50,000 would pay, on average, a marginal tax rate (federal plus state)
of about 33 percent and thus have marginal tax rates about 20 percent-
age points lower than in Canada.6
These comparisons do not include social security taxes.  Social
security is largely funded through general revenues in Canada, while it
is funded by a payroll tax in the United States.  When social security
taxes are included, the share of social security and personal income
taxes in GNP in 1987 was 18.0 percent in Canada and 19.5 percent in
the United States (Wilson 1992).  The social security payroll tax rate in
Canada in 1999 was 7.0 percent, shared equally by employers and
employees, compared to 12.4 percent in the United States.  However, to
the extent social security benefits are related to earnings, some workers
may view the true social security tax rate as being lower than the statu-
tory rate (Burkhauser and Turner 1985). 
Empirical studies in the United States have shown that higher mar-
ginal income tax rates encourage the provision of pensions.  In their
study of pension coverage in 1979, 1988, and 1993, Reagan and Turner
(1997) found that, on average, a one percentage point increase in mar-
ginal income tax rates increases pension coverage rates by 0.4 percent-
age points.7  This finding suggests that, based solely on marginal
income tax rates, pension coverage would be roughly 5–7 percentage
points higher in Canada than in the United States.
Income tax progressivity
As well as being affected by the level of marginal income tax rates,
the tax incentive for pensions is greater, with greater progressivity of
the tax system.  Workers generally have lower income in retirement
than while working.  With a more progressive tax system, the greater
the reduction in income during retirement, the lower the marginal tax
rate paid on pension benefits. 
Because the highest marginal rate starts at a much lower income in
Canada, marginal rates are more “compressed.”  It might therefore
appear that higher income Canadians are less likely than Americans to
face lower marginal rates in their retirement years than while working.
In the United States, however, the tax system is also not very progres-
sive but for a different reason.  The top marginal bracket begins at a high
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income level, and a single marginal rate covers a wide range of the dis-
tribution of income.  Reagan and Turner (1997) found, in their regres-
sion sample of males aged 21–55 in 1979, that the mean marginal tax
rate (federal plus state) was 32 percent with a standard deviation of 13
percentage points.  These figures had declined in 1993 to a marginal
rate of 25 percent with a standard deviation of 9 percentage points.
Thus, neither the Canadian nor the U.S. tax system is very progressive.  
Tax subsidies for high-income workers
To examine further coverage rate differences between the two
countries, we focus separately on the tax treatment of high- and low-
income workers.  The centerpiece of the 1991 tax reform in Canada is
the establishment of a comprehensive limit to tax-assisted pension sav-
ing.  All workers are permitted to contribute the lesser of 18 percent of
their earned income (in the previous calendar year) or a maximum dol-
lar amount (if lower) to a RRSP.
For individuals with relatively high incomes, the tax assistance
provided to pension savings is considerably higher in the United States.
In the late 1990s, the maximum compensation that could be used for
calculating pension benefits that receive preferential tax treatment was
more than twice as high in the United States than Canada.8
Some benefits consultants have argued that a low ceiling on com-
pensation used for calculating pension benefits reduces the incentive
for employers to provide pensions because the personal benefit to high-
income employers is reduced.  This argument is most likely to be valid
for the owners of successful small firms, where the owner may weigh
the amount that he or she can accumulate in a pension versus the cost
of providing pensions to his or her employees.  If this argument is
valid, it may partially explain why pension coverage appears to be
lower in the private sector in Canada than in the United States.
Beginning in 1984 in the United States, some higher income tax-
payers have faced an implicit tax on their pension benefits in addition
to the personal income tax.  Up to 50 percent of social security benefits
could be included in taxable income for persons with adjusted gross
income plus certain nontaxable income above $25,000 for individuals
and $32,000 for married couples.  Under the 1993 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act, a two-tier tax liability was established, so that the
proportion of benefits for retirees with income in the second-tier range
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was increased to 85 percent.  Thus, at the margin for some workers,
increases in pension benefits are taxed at the worker’s marginal tax rate
and cause the worker’s social security benefits to become taxable.
Eighteen percent of families with social security benefits pay taxes on
those benefits, but more than half of families in the eighth, ninth, and
tenth deciles are taxed (Pattison 1994).  The net result is that many
higher income workers pay an implicit tax on pension benefits of 20 to
40 percent due to the taxation of their social security benefits.
In sum, high-income workers in Canada face a greater tax incen-
tive to invest in tax-sheltered assets than they do in the United States.
However, the amount they can shelter through pensions is lower. 
Implicit taxes on low-income workers
In addition to explicit taxes, implicit taxes may also reduce the net
receipt of pension benefits.  For Canadians with low lifetime earnings,
the income-tested component of the social security system discourages
participation in an employer-sponsored pension plan.  All Canadians
aged 65 and over, independent of their work history, receive a small flat
rate OAS benefit.  Canadians with no other source of income also
receive income-tested benefits from the Guaranteed Income Supple-
ment (GIS).  For each dollar of retirement income above the flat rate
OAS benefits, GIS benefits are reduced by 50 cents.  
The maximum pension payable from the earnings-related compo-
nent of Canada’s public retirement system, the Canada Pension Plan
(CPP), was based on maximum preretirement earnings of Can.$37,400
a year in 1999.  An individual receiving the maximum CPP benefit
would still qualify for partial GIS benefits if the individual had no other
retirement income than the flat rate OAS benefits.  So, too, would indi-
viduals not entitled to the maximum CPP benefit.
The net result is that Canadians with low lifetime earnings face a
50 percent tax rate on private pension income during retirement, in
addition to federal and provincial income taxes.  These public pension
provisions, in effect since 1966, provide a strong disincentive for low-
income workers to participate in an employer-sponsored pension plan.9
A similar disincentive exists in the United States due to the income
testing for eligibility for Supplemental Security Income, but that pro-
gram only effects very low income workers.
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Individual pension plans
The Canadian government has set contribution limits for money
purchase plans and RRSP equivalent to the limits for defined benefit
plans.  The federal tax rules treat employers and employees the same,
regardless of the type of pension plan.  
A primary objective of the Canadian tax treatment of pensions is to
provide equitable tax assistance for retirement, regardless of whether a
worker participates in a company-sponsored pension plan or in an indi-
vidual account pension plan.  In Canada, workers setting up RRSPs can
access approximately the same amount of tax assistance as do workers
participating in employer-provided plans.     
In the United States, no attempt has been made to equalize the
treatment between employer-sponsored plans and individual plans.
Employers in the United States have a near monopoly in the provision
of tax-favored pension benefits.  Since 1981, the maximum an individ-
ual can deduct for contributions to an Individual Retirement Account
(IRA) has been frozen at $2,000.10  Inflation has more than halved the
real value of this tax deduction.  The amount that can be contributed to
personal pension plans is only a small percentage of what can be con-
tributed to employer sponsored plans, while in Canada the amounts are
equal.
Registered Retirement Savings Plans also enjoy other advantages
over IRAs.  Since tax reform in 1990, failure to contribute to a RRSP
by the deadline does not cause the deduction to be lost.  Unused contri-
bution amounts may be carried forward, subject to a seven-year limit,
and deducted when made.  No such carry-forward provision exists for
IRAs.
Since 1990, there is no tax advantage to participating in an
employer-provided plan since an equal amount could be contributed to
an RRSP.  This change should cause a reduction in pension coverage
rates in Canada, with employer-provided plans being replaced by indi-
vidual account plans.  However, a study of data previous to that change
found no negative relationship between the amount of employer-pro-
vided pension assets held by an individual and their RRSP assets (Venti
and Wise 1994).  In 1987, for example, 37 percent of tax filers who
contributed to a pension plan also contributed to an RRSP versus only
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16 percent of tax filers who did not contribute to a pension plan (Fren-
ken 1990).  
Summary
In sum, the higher marginal income tax rates in Canada would—
other things equal—cause pension coverage rates to be roughly 5–7
percentage points higher than in the United States.  This effect may be
offset somewhat by higher social security tax rates in the United States.
An explanation for relatively lower pension coverage rates at lower
income levels is that the income-tested provisions of the Canadian
social security system place an implicit tax of 50 percent on the pen-
sion benefits of workers with low lifetime earnings.    
Other explanations
Other factors besides taxes affect pension coverage.  Social secu-
rity is moderately more generous in Canada than in the United States,
which would lower pension benefit levels and probably also pension
coverage rates in Canada.  The United States, through nondiscrimina-
tion rules, requires employers that offer pensions to offer them to most
of their full-time employees.  This regulation is one way that public
policy attempts to expand coverage.  Canada has no such regulation.
  Since 1987 in most provinces in Canada, pension benefits are
locked in after vesting, and workers cannot access those benefits until
retirement.  In the United States, workers can take a lump sum distribu-
tion from their pension plan when they change jobs if the plan permits
it.  It has been argued in the United States that prohibiting preretire-
ment lump sum distributions would reduce pension coverage because it
would reduce the flexibility that workers have to use those funds for
nonretirement purposes.
The Generosity of Pension Plans 
While pension coverage measures one dimension of the extent that
pension plans provide an element of risk bearing concerning retirement
income, the generosity of pension plans measures another dimension.
One measure of pension plan generosity is the level of pension benefits
being paid to current retirees.  The level of pension benefits, however,
does not directly measure the generosity of pension benefit formulas
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because other factors also affect benefit levels.  For example, if a pen-
sion system is immature, workers having participated in it for less than
their full career, it will pay lower retirement benefits than an equally
generous system that is fully mature.  While it is not evident that the
Canadian and U.S. pension systems differ in their maturities, such a
difference could cause average benefit levels to differ.
Canadian private pension plans have been slightly less generous
than U.S. private plans in the level of benefits they provide.  Canadian
pensions in the late 1980s provided slightly less and U.S. pensions pro-
vided slightly more than $6,000 in annual benefits (Dailey and Turner
1992).
Canada and the United States differ considerably in the maximum
amount that a worker can save through the pension system.  In Canada,
the maximum percentage of earnings that a worker can save is lower
and, as indicated earlier, the maximum earnings that can be used in
determining pension benefits is much lower.
The maximum limit in Canada for contributions to a defined con-
tribution plan is 18 percent of worker earnings.  In Canada, the maxi-
mum benefit for a defined benefit plan is the lesser of $45,185 per year
or 70 percent of the participants earnings in the three highest years.
Both the defined contribution and defined benefit limits are higher
in the United States.  The maximum contributions to a defined contri-
bution plan in 1997 was 25 percent of earnings for most workers, and
for workers earning more than $120,000 a year it was $30,000.  For a
defined benefit plan, the maximum benefit was the lesser of $125,000 a
year or 100 percent of the participant’s average compensation for his or
her three highest-earnings years.  For high-income workers, the maxi-
mum pension benefit in Canada is less than half as large as in the
United States.
The lower maximum contributions and benefits in Canada, how-
ever, may be of little economic significance if few workers are con-
strained by the limits.  The difference is most likely to be constraining
for older workers and higher income workers who, because of the ceil-
ing on social security benefits, are more likely to wish to save a rela-
tively large fraction of their income for retirement.  
  If the 18 percent maximum is not a binding constraint in that most
workers save less, the higher marginal income tax rates in Canada
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would encourage middle income workers to save more in pensions than
they do in the United States. 
Defined Benefit versus Defined Contribution Plans
An employer’s first decision when considering pension risk  is
whether to provide a defined benefit or defined contribution plan or
both.  In both the United States and Canada, defined contribution plans
have grown at the expense of defined benefit plans.  
In the United States, there has been a major shift from defined ben-
efit plans towards defined contribution plans.  While the number of
active participants in defined benefit plans was nearly 4 million lower
in 1995 than in 1975, the number in defined contribution plans grew by
31 million, due to the growth of 401(k) plans (U.S. Department of
Labor 2000). 
There has also been a trend towards defined contribution plans in
Canada, but the trend has been much weaker.  Between 1982 and 1995,
for example, the percentage of pension participants who belonged to
money purchase plans rose from 5.3 percent to 10.0 percent, while the
percentage who belonged to defined benefit plans declined from 93.7
to 88.6 percent.11
If defined benefit plan assets in the United States were the same
percentage of pension assets in 1995 that they were in 1975, there
would have been $500 billion less in defined contribution assets and
the same amount more in defined benefit assets.  This works out to be
roughly $6,000 less in defined benefit assets per participant in the pri-
vate pension system.  Because of backloading of defined benefit pen-
sions and the accrual of benefits with greater job tenure, this number
would be higher for older workers and lower for younger workers.  If
the implicit insurance premium that firms charge workers for providing
defined benefit plans rather than defined contribution plans were a cou-
ple of percentage points of assets, older workers covered by defined
benefit plans have lost several hundred dollars a year in implicit insur-
ance value from the switch from defined benefit to defined contribution
plans.
In defined contribution plans, workers bear market risk to the
extent that the plans are invested in risky assets.  In defined benefit
plans, workers bear firm specific risks relating to the viability of the
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firm.  In financially strong firms, defined contribution plans are riskier
for workers than defined benefit plans.  By switching from defined ben-
efit to defined contribution plans in this situation, the firm is transfer-
ring risk from the shareholders to the workers.  The workers should be
willing to bear this risk if they are compensated for it.  It is likely, how-
ever, that shareholders have a greater capacity for risk bearing than do
workers.  Shareholders can diversify firm specific risk more easily (by
investing in other firms) than can workers, for whom firm specific risk
to earnings affects a large part of income-producing capacity.
Clark and McDermed (1990) ascribe most of the shift towards
defined contribution plans in the United States to changes in pension
policy that have made defined contribution plans relatively less costly
to provide than defined benefit plans.  Gustman and Steinmeier (1992),
however, argue that the dominant factor has been structural changes in
the economy—the relative decline in traditionally strong defined bene-
fit sectors of unionized and manufacturing employment. Both factors
have doubtlessly played a role, with their relative importance being less
clear.
It is commonly thought that defined contribution plans, where
investment risk work is borne by the worker, entail greater risk to
workers than do defined benefit plans, where investment risk is borne
by the employer.  The comparison is more complex, however.   Infla-
tion risk may be lower in defined contribution plans than in defined
benefit plans that do not provide postretirement cost-of-living adjust-
ments, which is frequently the case in small defined benefit plans.
Workers may bear some investment risk in defined benefit plans if
those plans adjust their generosity or are more likely to provide cost-
of-living adjustments when they have favorable investment returns.12
The loss of a job has more serious consequences with regard to
defined benefit pension benefits for an older worker than it does for a
younger worker.  Because defined benefit pensions are based on the
worker’s terminal nominal earnings in most plans, a worker who loses
his job in his late 40s suffers a large loss in future pension benefits
because inflation erodes the real value of his earnings used to calculate
his pension benefits.  Mobile workers bear less job-change risk in
defined contribution plans than in defined benefit plans because, once
vested, the value of future benefits is not reduced by job change in
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defined contribution plans while, with the exception of cash benefit
plans, it generally is in defined benefit plans (Turner 1993).  
Tax reform in Canada, implemented in 1990, seeks to “level the
playing field” with regard to the tax assistance provided to pension sav-
ing in different types of plans.  The maximum amount of tax assistance
provided to members of employer-sponsored defined benefit and
defined contribution plans, as well as to RRSPs, is intended to be
equal.  Further, through the introduction of a new carry-forward provi-
sion, individuals are provided with greater flexibility in the timing of
RRSP contributions.  This provision was enacted to give defined con-
tribution plans the flexibility afforded defined benefit plans because
firms who sponsor defined benefit plans can make retroactive enrich-
ments of their plans. 
In Canada, the 18 percent maximum allowable contribution to a
defined contribution plan was chosen because it is roughly equivalent
to the defined benefit limit.  The defined benefit limit is 2 percent of
final earnings per year of service, with a maximum of 70 percent of
highest earnings (Wyatt 1990).
In the United States, the defined benefit limit does not vary with
years of service, as it does in Canada.  The maximum benefit that can
be received from a defined contribution plan, in both Canada and the
United States, necessarily increases with service because the maximum
benefit is based on the accumulation of contributions and investment
earnings over time.  Because the U.S. limit does not vary with service,
short-service workers in the United States can receive higher benefits
through a defined benefit plan than they can through a defined contri-
bution plan.  For long-service workers, the situation is the reverse.
    Within its lower contribution limits, Canada allows individuals
greater flexibility in the timing of their contributions.  In Canada, an
individual’s unused contribution allowance in each year is carried for-
ward indefinitely for use in subsequent years, subject to certain dollar
limits.  Similarly, contributions not deductible in the year in which they
are paid may be deducted in subsequent years.
In the United States, contributions not deductible in the year paid
are subject to a 10 percent excise tax.  Before 1987, a credit carry-for-
ward was available when an employer’s contributions to a profit shar-
ing plan were less than the maximum allowed (McGill and Grubbs
1989, p. 652).  That carry-forward is no longer available.  Flexibility is
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provided, however, by the higher limit on contributions, so it is not
clear which system effectively provides the greater flexibility.  
In the United States, employee contributions are only tax deduct-
ible for defined contribution plans, and then only for contributions to
401(k) plans.  This feature of the tax code may favor these plans.  In
Canada, employee contributions are tax deductible to defined benefit
plans as well as defined contribution plans.  
The tax benefit of overfunding defined benefit plans
In assessing why employers might prefer defined benefit rather
than defined contribution plans, financial economists (Tepper 1981;
Black 1980) have drawn attention to the tax advantages to shareholders
of overfunding such plans.  In the United States, the Omnibus Recon-
ciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA) reduced the desirability of defined bene-
fit plans relative to defined contribution plans by reducing the amount
that could be contributed to overfunded defined benefit plans (Ippolito
1990).
Under the OBRA rules, employer contributions are not tax deduct-
ible if the plan is overfunded by 50 percent on a termination basis.  This
reduced the flexibility firms have in managing defined benefit plans, and
it reduced the amount that can be sheltered from tax.  Termination lia-
bilities are calculated as if the plan were to terminate immediately.  For
plans with a typical age structure of workers, these liabilities are con-
siderably less than the liabilities calculated assuming that the plan will
continue in existence.  Those liabilities for ongoing plans recognize that
currently accruing benefits are based on future wages, in final average
pay plans.  Under the OBRA rules, many defined benefit plans are not
able to contribute sufficient amounts to a pension plan to cover the cur-
rent accrual of liabilities.  This creates a tax disadvantage for defined
benefit plans because, by comparison, firms can contribute equal to the
full current accrual of liabilities in defined contribution  plans. 
In Canada, too, the tax authorities seek to limit the amount of over-
funding in defined benefit plans.  However, the restrictions are less
onerous than those in the United States.  In Canada, employer contribu-
tions are tax deductible so long as the surplus in the plan is no more
than 10 percent of actual plan liabilities or twice the annual value of
current service contributions.  However, the plan’s liabilities are not
valued on a termination basis for the purpose of this calculation.  If the
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plan has a history of cost-of-living or similar adjustments, these may be
taken into account in determining the plan’s liability if it is reasonable
to assume that such adjustments will continue.  These adjustments
would include, for example, ad hoc increases for pensioners and
increases in accrued benefits under career average earnings plans and
flat benefit plans.  In Canada, a potentially more important constraint
on the extent of overfunding is the uncertainty that may exist as to the
ownership of surplus assets.
Summary
In Canada, an effort has been made to equalize the treatment of
defined benefit and defined contribution plans.  As a result, employee
contributions are tax deductible for both defined benefit and defined
contribution plans, while they are only tax deductible to one type of
defined contribution plan in the United States.  Defined benefit plans
also receive more favorable tax treatment in Canada than they do in the
United States in terms of allowable maximum funding.  Greater flexi-
bility is allowed for contributions to defined contribution plans in Can-
ada than in the United States in order to try to equalize the degree of
flexibility that employers and employees have to contribute to both
types of plans.  On balance, tax policy in Canada is relatively more
favorable to defined benefit plans than it is in the United States.  Per-
haps, in part for that reason, defined benefit plans are relatively more
prevalent in Canada.  
COMPARISON OF THE RISK BEARING ASPECTS 
OF THE CANADIAN AND U.S. OCCUPATIONAL 
PENSION SYSTEMS
The Canadian and U.S. pension systems can be compared in terms
of several aspects of risk bearing.
Early Retirement Insurance
Many defined benefit RPP beneficiaries in Canada who take early
retirement receive a supplementary benefit, called a bridging benefit,
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from the time of retirement until age 65 (Frenken 1995).  This type of
benefit is also provided by some U.S. defined benefit plans, but it is not
available from defined contribution plans in either country.
Pension Insurance
The use of pension insurance is a major difference between the
pension systems of Canada and the United States.  The United States
insures defined benefit pension benefits through the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).  Canada, with the exception of one
province (Ontario), does not insure pension benefits.  Does this differ-
ence imply that defined benefit pension benefits are less risky in the
United States?  Not necessarily, because Canada reduces pension bene-
fit risks through regulations that assure that defined benefit plans will
be adequately funded. 
Ontario’s Pension Benefit Guaranty Fund (PBGF) became opera-
tional in 1983, to cover part of accrued benefits of private defined ben-
efit plans.  Premiums initially consisted of 0.2 percent of the unfunded
liability reported by the sponsor.  Policymakers realized this was a poor
measure of the risk to the insurance fund.  Ontario subsequently modi-
fied the premium structure to include an annual charge of Can.$1 per
active participant or beneficiary and a sliding scale for the annual risk-
adjusted component.  The scale increases to 1.5 percent of unfunded
liabilities for larger unfunded liabilities.   Unlike the maximum benefit
guaranteed by the PBGC in the United States, which is price indexed,
the maximum guaranteed benefit of Can.$1,000 per month has not
been increased since the program’s inception and thus has considerably
eroded in real value due to inflation.  The maximum guaranteed benefit
is now about one-third the level of the maximum guaranteed benefit in
the United States.  In addition, there are qualifying restrictions that do
not apply in the United States.  A terminated worker must be at least 45
years old with 10 years of service when terminated to be covered by
the insurance.  For active employees, their sum of age and years of ser-
vice must total more than 55.
The PBGC in the United States acts like a pension safety net for
most participants in defined benefit plans.  It prevents the devastating
loss of pension benefits that occurred in the early 1970s with the bank-
ruptcy of some firms.  Often, firms that have become bankrupt and
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have defined benefit pensions have underfunded their pensions.
Underfunding formerly was a concern for workers in firms that were
financially weak.  The PBGC provides workers with the assurance that
payment of their pension is no longer entirely dependent on their
employer’s financial health.  
The PBGC does not guarantee all benefits, and most workers do
not receive what they would have received from their plan had it con-
tinued in existence.  It guarantees what it considers to be basic benefits.
These include the vested benefits of people age 65 and older that have
been in effect for five years or longer—up to a limit, which increases
each year with inflation.  In 1995, the annual limit was $30,886 for
workers age 65.  The cap is lower for younger workers.  Other guaran-
teed benefits include survivor’s annuity benefits.
Legislative reforms were enacted in 1994 in the Retirement Protec-
tion Act.  While there once was concern about adequacy of the funding
of PBGC, with the legislative changes that have improved both
PBGC’s funding and the funding of the plans it insures, it has sufficient
assets to cover anticipated benefit payments for many years.
  CONCLUSIONS
It appears that, in both Canada and the United States, the probabil-
ity of pension coverage given worker characteristics has declined, indi-
cating that risk sharing through pensions has declined.  Furthermore,
defined benefit coverage has declined and defined contribution cover-
age has increased in both countries.  These changes have increased the
risks borne by long-term employees but have decreased the risk for
job-changing employees. In the United States, most defined benefit
plan participants are covered by pension benefit insurance, which is not
the case in Canada.  Overall, it appears that risk bearing has increased
for workers in both Canada and the United States due to changes in the
occupational pension systems in the two countries.  
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Notes
1. This study used the 1988 purchasing power parity of Can.$1 equals U.S.$0.80.
We use the slightly lower value of U.S.$0.75 for making comparisons.
2. The lower average social security benefits in the United States may arise in part
because more older Americans are working and not receiving social security ben-
efits.
3. In the United States, premium payments to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpo-
ration are based on the unfunded liabilities of pension plans.  This is also true for
the Guarantee Fund in Ontario.  We are not considering these levies as taxes.
4. Generally, a tax policy affecting a worker’s decisions distorts economic activity
from what it would have been without taxes.  However, in a system with multiple
taxes, one aspect of taxation may correct distortions introduced by another aspect.
The optimality of pension tax policy in terms of creating or correcting distortions
is not discussed here (Ippolito 1990).
5. We thus do not discuss, for example, the effects of taxation of pensions on income
distribution, government revenues, or the capital market.
6. The higher marginal personal income taxes in Canada are reflected in personal
income taxes being about 25 percent larger as a percentage of GNP in Canada
than in the United States (Wilson 1992).
7. The marginal effect is probably lower at higher tax rates.  See also Woodbury
(1983), Woodbury and Bettinger (1991), and Woodbury and Huang (1991).
8. An explanation for the more favorable tax treatment for pensions of high-income
workers in the United States than in Canada may be that, with its higher income
inequality, there are relatively more high-income workers in the United States,
and therefore they presumably have more political power.
9. This issue has important implications, as well, for public policy.  In Canada, the
fact that pension coverage is far from universal is often cited by critics as proof of
the inadequacy of the private pension system and the need, therefore, to expand
the public pension system or to mandate private pension coverage.  (In 1995, 45.3
percent of males and 44.1 percent of females who were paid workers belonged to
an occupational pension plan [Statistics Canada 1996].)  However, the absence of
universal coverage is perhaps best seen as a statement about workers’ revealed
preferences rather than as a “failure” of the private pension system.
The introduction of a mandatory private pension plan—inclusive of part-time
as well as full-time workers—is likely to reduce the lifetime resources available to
those with low lifetime earnings.  The incidence of employer contributions to a
mandatory private pension plan (if it is not retroactive) is likely to fall ultimately
on the employee.  Workers, including those with low lifetime earnings, will be
required to allocate a larger fraction of their lifetime earnings to provide for their
retirement years.  On one hand, this will gradually reduce the likelihood of future
claims on income-tested programs such as GIS.  On the other hand, by forcing
persons with low lifetime earnings to provide a larger share of their own retire-
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ment incomes, this proposal may redistribute income away from those with low
lifetime earnings.
In this context, two facts merit note.  First, persons whose current earnings are
low are less likely to be members of occupational pension plans.  To the extent
that current earnings are positively correlated with lifetime earnings, this fact sug-
gests that those with low lifetime earnings are less likely to be covered by an
occupational pension plan.  Second, Canadians with low current incomes gener-
ally choose not to contribute to RRSPs.  Given the low value to them of the tax
subsidy associated with RRSP contributions together with the likelihood that they
would be substituting their own savings for retirement for benefits available from
income-tested public programs, this decision is probably rational.
10. The amount is $2,500 for a worker whose spouse does not also contribute to an
IRA.
11. These figures do not add to 100 percent due to the presence of “composite and
other plans.”
12. For a discussion of how participants in defined benefit plans may bear at least
some of the investment risk of the pension fund, see Hyatt and Pesando (1997).  In
a unionized firm, for example, poor fund performance may require the employer
to make additional plan contributions.  In this event, the employer may seek wage
or other concessions in the next round of collective bargaining.
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